倪骁然| 193期双周学术论坛：Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

一、主题：Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

二⚆、主讲人🧜🏽‍♂️：倪骁然🧑🏽‍🎓，清华大学经济管理K8凯发金融系博士研究生。本科毕业于清华大学🕺🏿。主要研究领域为公司治理和中国资本市场👩🏻‍⚕️。研究成果曾在Economics Letters、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》等国内外刊物发表🏦。

三、时间🥇：2017年3月15日（周三）🙅🏿‍♀️，12:30-13:30

四🧝🏼‍♂️、地点：K8凯发南路校区主教学楼910会议室

五🤙🏼、主持人：黄志刚，凯发平台副教授

Abstract: Exploiting the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as exogenous shocks to filing derivative lawsuits, we find that weakened shareholder litigation rights cause a significant increase in the cost of debt. Further analyses indicate this relation is largely driven by heightened managerial risk-taking. Shareholders respond to these changes by providing managers with less risk-taking incentives. Overall, our findings suggest that the shareholder litigation rights are important to debtholders.