THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES ? VOL. 31, NO. 1 ? NOVEMBER 2018

股份兑现月的新闻发布策略

作者：Alex Edmans (London Business School, CEPR, and ECGI)

Luis Goncalves-Pinto (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Moqi Groen-Xu (London School of Economics)

Yanbo Wang (Sungkyunkwan University)

摘要🦟：我们利用股份兑现月份计划，发现首席执行官在预计出售股权的月份里🏊🏽‍♂️，会多发布20%具有操纵性质的新闻。股份兑现方案在几年前股份授予之时就已经确定👷🏻，因此不太可能受现阶段信息环境的影响🎥。只有正面新闻的数量上升了，而负面新闻、中性新闻，以及非自由选择的新闻数量没有上升🚖。首席执行官在股权兑现的前一月到后一月之间发布新闻，导致股票价格和市场流动性暂时上升🚖，随后迅速套现。

Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months

Alex Edmans (London Business School, CEPR, and ECGI), Luis Goncalves-Pinto (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Moqi Groen-Xu (London School of Economics), Yanbo Wang (Sungkyunkwan University)

ABSTRACT

We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months in which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior and thus unlikely to be driven by the current information environment. The increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative news, nor nondiscretionary news. News releases fall in the month before and month after the vesting month. News in vesting months generates a temporary increase in stock prices and market liquidity, which the CEO exploits by cashing out shortly afterwards.

原文链接：https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/31/11/4099/5054919

翻译🧑🏿‍🚀：吕越