Review of Finance, Volume 22, Issue 4, July 2018, Pages 1515–1548

竞争激励和公司研发

作者：Carl Hsin-han Shen (National Central University, Taiwan, China), Hao Zhang (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, USA)

摘要

本研究分析了对非CEO高管的以升职为基础的竞争激励是如何影响对企业研发的。我们利用CEO与下一层高管之间的薪酬差距来衡量竞争激励⚾️。我们发现，竞争激励与创新效率（以每百万美元的研发费用所产生的专利数量和专利引用数量来衡量）正相关。当进行工具变量分析时，或者利用其他的研发测度（例如专利概括性👍，独创性指数以及股票市场对专利授予的反应）进行回归时，我们的主要发现继续成立。与之前的理论一致，竞争激励的积极影响在CEO离职前的时期表现得尤为明显🚖。

Tournament Incentives and Firm Innovation

Carl Hsin-han Shen (National Central University, Taiwan, China), Hao Zhang (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, USA)

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes how promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO senior executives affect corporate innovation. We measure tournament incentives using the pay gap between a CEO and the next layer of senior executives. We find that tournament incentives are positively related to innovative efficiency, as measured by the number of patents and patent citations generated per million dollars of R&D expense. Our main finding holds in an instrumental-variable analysis and regressions using alternative innovation measures, including patent generality and originality indices and stock market reactions to patent grants. Consistent with prior theories, the positive effect of tournament incentives is found to be particularly pronounced during the period prior to CEO turnovers.

原文链https://academic.oup.com/rof/article-abstract/22/4/1515/3608702?redirectedFrom=fulltext翻译：阙江静